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Abstract
This paperusesaunique Portuguesedataset to examine theeffectof unemployment benefit receipt
and maximum duration of benefits on escape rates from unemployment. The focus is on the time
profileoftransitionsoutofunemployment.Thenovelaspectofthestudyresidesinitsidentification
of six destination states, namely, open-ended employment, fixed-term contracts, part-time work,
government-provided jobs, self employment, and labor force withdrawal. Strong evidence of




This paper offers an examination of the impact of access to unemployment benefits in Portugal on
unemployment duration. The effect of subsidization of the search process on jobless duration is of
coursefamiliarterritory,andsothepresenttreatmentextendstheconventionalanalysisintwomain
ways. First, it allows for time-varying effects of unemployment insurance benefits on jobless
duration, as suggested byboth the labor-leisure and job search models. Since this phenomenon has
also been recognized in an admittedlysparser empirical literature (e.g. Meyer, 1990; Fallick, 1991;
NarendranathanandStewart,1993a;Belzil,1995),thesecondextensionconsideredhereallowsfora
variety of exit options available to the unemployed individual. To be sure, the extant literature has
recognized that unemployment and inactivity are behaviorally distinct states (see Flinn and
Heckman, 1983; Addison and Portugal, 2003), but has generally failed draw distinctions between
differenttypesofemploymentotherthanfull-timeandpart-timejobs(NarendranathanandStewart,
1993b; McCall, 1996). And to our knowledge there has been no attempt to investigate whether
access to benefits serves in practice to mediate choices between these different routes to
reemployment.
From a European perspective, it is germane to distinguish between open-ended or regular
contracts of employment and fixed-term contracts. This is because the latter have tended to be the
main means of circumventing ambitious employment protection rules. The classic example is
provided by Spain where fixed-term contracts constitute 35 percent of all dependent employment
and around 90 percent of all new contracts (Bover et al., 2000). Fixed-term contracts perform the
function of a labor buffer stock and, to complicatematters, also serveasascreeningmechanism for
inducting workers into open-ended employment (Varejão and Portugal, 2001, 2002). Another3
distinction worth pursuing in a European context (especiallyrelevant in Mediterranean or southern
European nations) is the option of self employment again for reasons having to do with differential
(i.e. more sweeping) employment protection legislation (see OECD, 1999). Finally, jobs provided
through the public employment service are a more important exit option in Europe than in, say, the
United States because of the greater emphasis placed on active labor market policies in the former
region.And,althoughfixedterminnature,publicly-providedjobsshouldnotbeuncriticallylumped
together with the generality of fixed-term contracts. For all these reasons, a more realistic
characterization of theEuropean experienceimplies theidentificationofmultipledestinationstates
(see Bonnal et al., 1997). In addition to labor market withdrawal and part-time employment,
therefore,wewillalsoconsideropen-endedemployment,fixed-termcontracts,government-provided
jobs, and self employment.
Ifindividualsdoindeedchoosebetweenanumberof reemploymentoptions(andinactivity),
there are several sources of aggregation bias attaching to estimations based on an aggregate hazard
function regression model. First, and most obviously, if individuals attach different utilities to the
various alternatives to unemployment, regression effects may differ markedly across destinations.
Thus,totakeunemploymentinsuranceasacaseinpoint,accesstobenefitscanmateriallyinfluence
the choice of destination state because the variable will enter as a negative (and possibly time-
varying)costintheindividualutilityfunction.Moreconcretely,iftheindividualisdrawingbenefits
in a regime that does not allow benefits to be paid in conjunction with part-time employment, it is
unlikely that we will observe transitions into such employment prior to the point of benefit
exhaustion. Second, the underlyingcause-specific baseline hazard functions themselves maydiffer
materially across destination states, thereby yielding differences in the timing of transitions out of4
unemployment forobservationally-equivalentunemployedpersons.Forinstance,ifindividualsplace
a higher value on permanent job offers than shorter-term employment opportunities they may be
expected (initiallyat least) to search more intensivelyoverthe formertypeofvacancies.And,totake
another example, transitions into part-time employment may only be observed after all hope of
obtaining a full-time job is extinguished, at which point hazard rates would spike sharply. In short,
use of an aggregate hazard function (and associated regression effects, including access to and
duration of benefits) may be expected to compound distinct and possibly even contradictory
influences. The disaggregated, competing risks treatment pursued here is designed to account for
suchdifferenceswiththeoverallobjectiveofofferinganimprovedunderstandingofunemployment
transitions and the role of unemployment insurance in this regard.
Finally,therelevanceofthePortuguesecaseisthatitisbroadlyrepresentativeof continental
Europe in terms its joblessness and institutional framework. At the same time, the stringencyof its
employment protectionregime(BlanchardandPortugal,2001)offersaninterestingcontextinwhich
to examine transitions into atypical work.
II. Data
Our data are taken from the nationally representative Portuguese quarterly employment surveys
Inquérito ao Emprego for the period 1992(2)-1997(4), conducted by the Instituto Nacional de
Estatistica(INE).Thechoiceofperiodisdictated bychangesinthemethodologyoftheemployment
survey after the first quarter of 1992. The changes made included new sampling procedures and
revisions to the definition of employment, unemployment, and inactivity.
Each quarter, the INEinquires of a random sample ofindividuals theircurrent labormarket5
status and past labor history. In this sense, just like the Current Population Survey, the Portuguese
employment surveysamples the population of members of astateata given timeand observes their
elapsed durations. This sampling plan is referred to as stock sampling, and the elapsed (necessarily
incomplete)durationsareknownasbackwardrecurrencetimes.Asiswellknown,thedistributionof
elapsed durations of a stock (of, say, the unemployed) gives a distorted image of the distribution of
complete durationsofa flowof entrants (in to theunemploymentstate).Thisisbecausethesampling
planover-sampleslongdurations(so-called‘lengthbiasedsampling’)andcontainsinformationonly
on spells currently in progress. As a result, mean unemployment duration is both over- and
under-stated.
Such problems can be partially overcome, however, by a joint modeling of the elapsed
durationdistribution,theprobabilityofbeingsampled,andthe historyofflows intoastate.Yetthis
procedure maystill impose too much structure on the data andrequireinformationonentrant flows
that is typically unavailable to the researcher. A feasible and much simpler alternative procedure –
and that followed here – is available if the members of a state at a given time are observed over a
fixedtimeinterval.Inthesecircumstances,wecanobtaininformationontheremainingduration(or
forward recurrence time) that, conditional on elapsed duration, is distributed as the entrant
conditional density function (Lancaster, 1990).
Thequarterlyemploymentsurveyhasaquasi-longitudinalcapacity.Onesixthofthesample
rotate out of the sample each quarter, so that we can track transitions from unemployment for up to
five quarters, and hence pursue the conditional approach. Transition rates are then obtained simply
by identifying those unemployed individuals in the survey, and their elapsed duration in a given
quarter, who move out of unemployment over the subsequent quarter. The destination states of6
previouslyunemployed workers canalso be identified.Forthepresentpurposes,weshalldistinguish
between six such states: open-ended employment (i.e. permanent jobs), fixed-term contracts,
part-time employment, jobs provided by the public employment agency, self employment, and
economic inactivity (i.e. withdrawal from the labor force). We note parenthetically that
publicly-provided jobs are at subsidized wages in the municipal sector and are fixed-term innature.
Focusingforthemomentonunemployment,eachsurveycontainsinformationonthelength
of the current unemployment spell in months and the unemployment benefit status of the worker –
as either a recipient or nonrecipient of benefits. ‘Recipiency’ may reflect either receipt of
unemploymentinsuranceproperoralowerorderofunemploymentbenefits,termedunemployment
assistance. We cannot with precision disentangle the two cetegories. Under Portuguese law,
individuals have to have been employed for at least 18 months during the two years prior to the
unemployment event to draw UI benefits proper. Individuals who do not fulfill these requirements
can draw unemployment assistance if they have more than six months insured employment in the
year preceding unemployment. In addition, workers who have exhausted UI benefits can claim
unemployment assistance. In both cases, access to unemployment assistance hinges on per capita
family income; only those whose per capita income is less than 80 percent of the minimum wage
qualify for unemployment assistance.
For much of our analysis we will not distinguish between types of unemployment benefit
recipient.Nevertheless, wewilloffer necessarilyverytentativeresultsforameasureofeligibilityfor
thetwotypesofunemploymentbenefit.Thedistinctionisbasedsolelyonrecipientstatusandtenure
on the job thatimmediatelypreceded the unemploymentevent (our datado not contain information
on per capitafamilyincome). In this exercise, personsrecordedascollectingunemploymentbenefits7
who had at least 18 months oftenureon thelast job areclassified as eligiblefor UIbenefits(ELIG).
Those individuals drawing benefits with between 6 and 18 months of tenure on the last job are
identified as recipients of unemployment assistance (ASSISTANCE). To repeat, this procedure is
imprecise; in particular, those classified as recipients of unemployment assistance may in fact be
receiving UI benefits if they had built up the necessary service requirement in (unobserved) jobs
preceding that immediately prior to unemployment. That being said, the eligibility measure will
assist us in going beyond the more aggregative results based on a simple benefits recipiency binary
variable.
In addition to modeling the effects of recipiency (and, to a lesser extent, eligibility), we are
also concerned to assess the impact of unemployment benefit duration on escape rates from
unemployment and transitions to the various destination states. Under Portuguese law, duration of
unemployment insurance benefits is exclusively a function of age. The maximum duration of
benefits is 10 months for those aged less than 25 years and then rises in roughly 3-month intervals
for each incremental 5 years of age to 30 months at age 55.
1
As a practical matter, however, in calculatingmaximum duration we will assume, first, that
allindividualsrecorded ascollectingunemploymentbenefitsareentitledtoUIbenefitsand,second,
that they do not go on to receive unemployment assistance. (Note, however, that even if such
individuals do proceed to collect unemployment assistance, the reduced amount of benefits then
payablewouldalsoproduceaspikeinthetransitionrateoutofunemployment.)Maximumduration
is of interest because it allows us to determine the individual’s time to benefit exhaustion on the




2 Time-varying effects of unemployment benefits can be accommodated
with information on the beneficiary’s elapsed unemployment duration, either using the same
intervals as employed for the baseline hazard or aggregating over certain of those intervals. In
addition, nonlinearities can be introduced in to timeto exhaustion ofbenefits.Both approacheswill
be deployed, our favored approach being the latter.
In sum, from the information in the surveywe develop a number of variables to capture the
effects of the unemployment benefit system. These are, first, a dummy variable denoting recipient
status(compoundingUIandunemploymentassistance);second,acrudetenure-determinedmeasure
of eligibilityfor each type of benefit; and, third,remainingweeks ofbenefit entitlement (maximum
duration of regular benefits less elapsed jobless duration). As noted, two methods of allowing for
time-varying effects are also introduced.
The employment surveycontains in addition to unemployment duration, destination status,
and unemployment benefit status, information on the individual’s age, marital status, level of
schooling, tenure on the lost job, number of jobs held (and whether or not the individual is a new
entrant to the labor market), broad occupational status, reason for job loss, and region of residence,
inter al. Descriptive information on these and other variables is provided in the Appendix Table.
The main restrictions placed on the data were that the individual be unemployed at the time
ofthesurvey,agedbetween16and64years,and residentinmainlandPortugal.Further,givenwell-
known gender differences in supply behavior, we also excluded females. Finally, in recognition of
potential sampleattrition,we ensuredthatindividualsappearingincontiguoussurveyswiththesame
identifier were in fact the same individual. The resulting sample size is 9,451 individuals.9
III. Methodology
A useful concept in statistical analysis of duration is the notion of a hazard function. In the studyof
unemployment duration, the hazard function gives the instantaneous probability of exiting






















where f(t) is the probability density function, F(t) is the distribution function, S(t) is the survival
function. A noteworthy relational function is the integrated hazard function
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where the time axis is divided into K intervals by points c1, c2 …, cK-1.In specifying the baseline
hazard function, we use eleven intervals. The first six intervals correspond to calendar months, the
nexttwointervalsarethreemonthseach,whiletheninthandtenthintervalsareofsixmonthslength.10
The final (open-ended) interval thus covers elapsed durations of twenty-five months or more. In
other words, the knot points are 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 12, 18, and 24.
Weshallalsodistinguishbetweensixexitmodesoutofunemployment:full-timefixed-term
contracts, full-time open-ended contracts, part-time employment, self-employment, public
employment,andinactivity.Hence,wedefinethecause-specifichazardfunctionstodestinationjas
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yielding the aggregate hazard function
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The model has a conventional competing risks interpretation. In this framework, a latent
duration (Tj) unemployment attaches to each exit mode. We only observe the minimum of each
latent variable. If risks are assumed to be independent, with continuous duration, this model
simplifies to six separate single-cause hazard models.
A popular way to accommodate the presence of observed individual heterogeneity is to
specify a proportional hazards model
j x
j j e t h x t h
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whereh0j(t)denotesthebaselinespecifichazardfunction,thatis,thehazardfunctioncorresponding
to null values for the covariates x . In this case, the covariates affect the hazard function







j β = ). An implication of this assumption is that impact of the
covariates does not change (in relative terms) with the progression of the spell of unemployment.
Our information on elapsed duration of unemployment is grouped into monthly intervals
(while transitions can only observed over a fixed interval of three months). Let M=mdenote the
occurrence of an exit in a given month [ ) t t c c , 1 − ,w h e r em is the realization of a discrete random
unemploymentdurationvariableM∈ (1,...,K).Theprobabilitythataneventoccursinthem
thinterval
(that is, an exit occurs over the course of the three-month window), and that such an exit is to
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where we neglect t and x for the sake of parsimony.
The functions
r
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m S − 1 ) provide a convenient characterization of the probability











m m S S , which is simply the product of the specific survivor functions.
Apart from the discrete nature of the unemployment duration data, we need to payattention
tothe typeofsamplingplanbeingusedinordertoavoidthelengthbiassamplingproblemsinduced12
by stock sampling (Flinn, 1986). Recall that in our sample the stock of unemployed individuals is
observed over a fixed interval of three months. In other words, at the time of the first survey the
elapsed duration of unemployment is recorded. Three months later, the labor market status of the
same individual is observed, providing us with information on whether he or she had left
unemployment and, if so, the destination state. With this sampling plan, we need to condition on
elapsed duration at the time of the first interview in order to recover the entrant density function.
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where θ is a vector of parameters that include regression coefficients and baseline hazard
parameters,and mj δ isanindicatorthatassumesthevalueofoneiftheindividualexitstodestination
j during the m





mj m δ δ identifies completed
durations, so that, m δ − 1 equals 1 for a censored observation. Notice that, after conditioning on
havingsurviveduntilm-t,the 3 − m S termcancelsout for completeddurations.Thecontributiontothe
likelihood functionfrom acensoredobservationissimplytheproduct,conditionalonsurvivingupto
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IV. Findings
Over our sample period, Portuguese unemployment rose by almost two-thirds – from 4.1.to 6.7
percent – and the mean (elapsed)duration ofunemploymentincreasedeveryyearfrom12.2months
in 1992 to 16.5 months in 1997. Not surprisingly, the distribution of unemployment has changed
fairly profoundly; in particular, the share of long-term unemployment (12 months or more) rose by
almost 75 percent, such that by the end of the sample period a little over two in five workers had
been out of work formorethanayear.But theproportion ofworkers coveredbytheunemployment
benefit system has not changed since 1993. Also, the maximum duration of benefits and the
replacement rate(65percent)haveremainedunchanged.Accordingly,itisthesharpincreaseinthe
number of unemployed individuals, and their jobless duration, that explain the near three-fold
increase in nominal outlays on unemployment benefits between 1992 and 1997.
Against this backdrop, we first consider the probability of escaping unemployment at the
mostgenerallevel(i.e.withoutdistinguishingbetweendestinationstates).Aninitialindicationofthe14
effects of unemployment benefits on escape rates is provided by the empirical hazard functions in
Figure 1. Despite the narrowing in the difference between the escape rates of recipients and
nonrecipientsthroughtime,thereisprimafacieevidenceofbothmarkedandpersistentdisincentive
effects of access to benefits.
(Figure 1 near here)
Results for the basic duration model are given in Table 1.As was noted earlier, the baseline
hazard function is specified as an eleven-segment piecewise-constant function. The coefficient
estimatesinthetableshowtheeffectsoftheregressorsinproportionallyshiftingthebaselinehazard
up or down. The coefficient estimate of the variable of principal interest indicates that receipt of
unemployment benefits (the UB dummy) decreases the chance of exiting unemployment by 42
percent. The assumption that this disincentive effect is constant through time will of course
subsequently be relaxed.
(Table 1 near here)
Theeffectsoftheothercovariatescanbeverybrieflydescribed.First,notethatweuseseven
age dummies – the omitted category is individuals aged less than 25 years – to coincide with the
age-determined nature of duration entitlement. Absent this specification, it could beargued that the
unemployment benefit effect is picking up the effects of aging on jobless duration. As can be seen,
thisisnotthecasebecausethedeclineinescaperateswithageisnearmonotonic.Second,theeffects
of the TENURE, DISABLED, SCHOOLING, and MARRIED covariates are thoroughly
conventional, with the first two arguments serving to reduce escape rates and the last two being
associated with higher escape rates. Third, greater labor market experience/knowledge, indexed by
theJOBSvariable(andalsonegativelybyFIRSTJOB),seemstotranslateintoreducedjoblessness.15
Note in particular that new entrants are 21 percent lesslikelyto exit fromunemployment than other




of unemployment rate differences across broad areas of the country (the high hazard rates of the
Center region being notable in this regard).
(Table 2 near here)
We next consider summary results from alternative characterizations of the effect of
unemploymentbenefitsonescape rates.Theentryinthefirst columnofTable 2simplycarriesover
the unemployment benefit (UB) coefficient estimate from Table 1. Specification (2) uses the
alternativebenefitsmeasureTIMEEX,namely,timetoexhaustionofbenefits.Itwillberecalledthat
this measure pertainsto the exhaustion of UIbenefits and does not allowfor anysubsequent receipt
ofunemployment assistance.
3 Itisapparentthat escaperatesdeclinesubstantially,thefurtheristhe
insured unemployed worker from benefit expiration; specifically, the hazard rate declines by 4.1
percent for each remaining month of entitlement.
Specification (3) substitutes two imputed benefit measures for one, namely, ELIG and
ASSISTANCE. ELIG proxies eligibility for UI benefits and ASSISTANCE the entitlement to
lower-tier benefits in the form of social assistance. Aswe haveseen, eachisdefinedonthebasisof
the unemployed individual’s length of service in the job immediatelypreceding the unemployment
event, given recipiency. Of the two measures, imputed receipt of regular benefits has the stronger
effect. The relevant comparison is with the UB coefficient estimate in specification (1). Since the16
effectofactualreceiptofbenefitscompoundsthetwoeffects,itfollowsthatreplacementratesdrive
the result that imputed receipt of UI is stronger than actual benefit receipt.
The balance of the material in Table 2 allows for time-varying effects in UB receipt
(specifications (4)and(5)),aswellasnonlinearitiesin theTIMEEXmeasure(specification(6)).As
farasactualbenefitreceiptisconcerned,specification(4)identifiestime-varyingeffectsbyusingthe
same intervals as the baseline hazard, whereas specification (5) offers a more parsimonious
characterization by aggregating over those intervals. In the former case, it can be seen that the
negative effects of benefits on escape rates last for up to two years. In the latter case, the use of a
smaller number of intervals confirms the persistence of the benefits effect but perhaps makes more
transparent the result that this influence is not monotonic over the spell of joblessness.
Foritspart,theintroductionofnonlinearitiesintheeffectsofTIMEEXprovidesevidenceof
ratherdramaticdisincentiveeffects,thelongertheintervaltobenefitexhaustion.Forexample,with
two or more years of remaining entitlement, the recipient is 53 percent less likely to escape from
unemployment than his uninsured counterpart. At one year the difference is still 48 percent, falling
verymodestlyto47percentatsixmonths,andthenmoresteeplyto35percentat3monthsandto14
percent at one month.
(Table 3 near here)
Wenext considertheissueofdestination state.Samplemeansofjoblessdurationandtimeto
exhaustion of benefits (both in months), as well as unemployment benefit status, are given inTable
3.Comparingthestillunemployed(inthenextquarter)withindividualsenteringthesix destination
states, it can be seen that their elapsed unemployment duration is much longer. The proportion of
unemployment benefit recipients is also much greater among the remaining unemployed, with the17
obvious exception of those securing public employment. Individuals on government-sponsored
manpower programs typically draw unemployment benefits prior to enrollment.
From the base of Table 3, it can be seen that the most common form of transition is to
fixed-term contracts rather than open-ended employment.
4 In terms of elapsed duration, however,
open-ended employment has the shortest associated joblessness. As implied earlier, part-time
employment is associated with the most protracted unemployment, although we caution that the
number of transitions in this case is rather small. Finally, vis-à-vis the remainingdestination states,
self-employed persons and those entering in to fixed-term contracts use up most of their benefits.
(Table 4 near here)
The disaggregated version of the piecewise-constant hazards regression (first presented in
Table 1) is given in Table 4.
5 The estimates correct for unobserved individual heterogeneity. It is
immediately apparent that the regression coefficients vary widely from destination state to
destinationstate.
6Abstractingfromdifferencesintheeffectsofunemploymentbenefits–whichwill
beexaminedindetail below –therearea numberofotherinterestingresults.Thus,forexample,the
probabilityoffindingemploymentinopen-endedemploymentandfixed-termcontractsisdeclining
in age. But these effects of age are confined to full-time employment. (Not unexpectedly, similar
results but of opposing sign are reported for married individuals.). These findings caution against
uncritical aggregation bydestination state. Another interesting result is that disabilityis associated
with a sharply reduced likelihood of entering into open-ended employment. Although the same is
true of labor market inexperience, those who have ended their first job are also more likely to
become inactive which is patently not the case for disabled individuals. Further, the probability of
escaping in to permanent jobs is negatively associated with the unemployment rate. For other18
destination states no such statistically significant relation is evident, with the one exception of
inactivity. Interestingly, thereare indications that labor market withdrawalrisesinrecoveryandfalls
in recessions, pointing to the absence of conventional discouragement effects.
Perhapsthemost interestingdifferencesrevealedbyTable4,however,pertaintoopen-ended
employment versus fixed-term contracts. There are material differences in most of the coefficient
estimatesotherthanbenefitreceipt.Themainresultisthatworkersexitingintofixed-termcontracts
aretypicallyhigh-turnovergroups.Thatis,suchworkersaremorelikelytobelabormarketentrants,
to have been employed under fixed-term contracts in the past, to have held a larger number of jobs,
and tohavelowertenure.Ontheotherhand,thereisalsotheseeminglyawkwardresultthatworkers
with greater schooling are also more likelyto transition in to fixed-term contracts and less likelyto
findopen-endedemployment.Thelikelyreconciliationisthattherearetworatherdifferentprocesses
underlying full-time employment that operate in tandem. The dominant story remains the high
turnoverone:fixed-term contractsareusedas abufferlaborstockbyemployers,withhigh-turnover
groups locating and taking such employment. But firms also seem to use fixed-term contracts as a
screen and to deploythe screen more frequentlyin thecase of educated individuals. Research using
other data sets indicates that it is palatable for more educated workers to take employment under
fixed-term contracts because such individuals have better prospects of subsequently exiting in to
open-ended employment (see Varejão and Portugal, 2001, 2002).
(Table 5 near here)
The rest of our analysis is devoted exclusively to the effects of access to and duration of
unemployment benefits on the probability of entering a particular destination state. Panel (a) of
Table5 carries overtheUBfindings from Table4andsupplementsthemwithsummaryresultsfrom19
a specification that substitutes TIMEEX for the binary unemployment benefits measure, UB. The
general opening observation is that, again with the obvious exception of publicly-provided
employment, there are strong disincentive effects of unemployment benefits across all destination
states.BeginningwiththeUBvariable,perhaps themost strikingresult is theabsolutemagnitudeof
the disincentive effect in the case of part-time employment – and, to a somewhat lesser extent, for
selfemployment.Unemploymentbenefitrecipientsarerespectivelyseventimesandthreetimesless
likely than recipients to enter these states. Neither result is surprising: insured workers have
reservation wages that typicallyexceed the part-time wage, while for self employment theoutcome
presumably reflects optimal timing considerations (see below). There is no indication that
unemployment benefits facilitate entry in to stable jobs – compare the very similar point estimates
for UB in open-ended employment and fixed-term contracts – but we have already commented on
thepossibilitythat forsomeindividuals fixed-termcontracts areameansofsubsequentlyaccessing
open-ended employment.
Thetimetobenefitexhaustionmeasure,TIMEEX,providessomeadditionalinformationon
the role of unemployment benefits. Disincentive effects for other than those entering public
employment are indicated throughout and in each case parallel those obtained for the UB binary
measure. Although the smallest disincentive effects are observed for fixed-term contracts, there is
now even less to differentiate the two forms of full-time employment.
(Figure 2 near here)
Panel(b) ofTable 5providesresults fornonlinearitiesintheeffectsofTIMEEX.Tofacilitate
interpretation, the relationships are also graphed in Figure 2, which again expresses the percentage
changes in transition ratesofinsured recipientsover theentitlementperiod,nonrecipients beingthe20
benchmark. The figure omits part timers and public employment because of the small number of
transitions in to these destination states and the large standard errors of the coefficient estimates.)
Thepattern is roughlyconsistent across destination states. That is,thereisthesuggestionthatescape
rates rise – albeit at different rates – as the benefit period shrinks. Open-ended employment is
something of an exception in having relatively high escape rates for the two most remote intervals
(Figure 3 near here)
Baseline hazard functions, again corresponding to thespecification in panel (b)of the table,
are given in Figure 3. The functions apply to an individual with sample average characteristics in
respect of the continuous variables SCHOOLING, TENURE, JOBS, and UNEMPLOYMENT




four months of unemployment although it is much reduced thereafter. For fixed-term contracts, the
decline in escape rates is much less evident. Indeed, generally high hazard rates characterize this
destination state. Taken in conjunction, however, the two baseline hazards perhaps contain the
suggestionthat someunemployedjobseekersinitiallylookingforopen-endedemploymentswitchto
sampling fixed-term contracts after a period of unsuccessful search.
Evidenceofpossibleswitchingbehavioris moreclearlyrevealedbytheW-shapedpatternof
thebaselinehazardfortransitionsintopart-time work. Theargument here might bethat at leasttwo
waves of unemployed individuals after unproductive search for full-time jobs ultimately settle on
part-time employment, while those wanting such jobs ab initio locate them fairly quickly. For its21
part, the pattern of thebaselinehazardfortransitionsintogovernment-providedjobsprovides only
weak evidence that the public authorities target the long-term unemployed.
As far as labor force withdrawal and self employment are concerned there is evidence of
positivedurationdependence,withrisingescaperatesovertime.Thisismostobviouslythecasefor
inactivitywheretherisingprofileofescaperatesisnowmoreindicativeofdiscouragement. Finally,
escape rates into self employment display a pattern reminiscent of the part-time destination state.
That is, there is everyindication that those who value self-employment find such work readilywith
others tending to drift in to self employment thereafter.
V. Conclusions
This paperhasused auniquedataset to investigatetheeffects of unemployment benefits on jobless
duration. Apart from its representative nature and useful human capital/demographic content, the
dataset containsinformation on unemploymentbenefitrecipiency,hasaquasi-longitudinalcapacity,
and permitsidentification ofalargernumberofdestination statesthanhasbeen usedin theduration
literature. Unlike administrative data, however, it does not contain information on benefit duration
(which has to be imputed) or on the amount of benefits received. That being said, the former
deficiency is mitigated by the exclusively age-related nature of benefit duration in Portugal, while
the latter omission is not really a problem given the general uniformity of replacement rates.
The major innovation of the paper has been the use of a competing risks model to
characterizetransitionsoutofunemployment,therebyaccommodatingbehaviorallydistinctchoices
on the part of job seekers. Our results confirmed that one cannot assume common regression
coefficients across destination states. The use of an aggregate approach was shown to compound22
distinct and even contradictory effects of the covariates.
In investigatingthe effectsofthevariousunemploymentbenefitmeasures,largedisincentive
effectswereobserved acrossalldestinationstates.Theexception,andonethatwasanticipated,was
the public employment option. Some more specific findings were the huge disincentive effect of
unemploymentbenefitsontransitionsintopart-timeemployment,anduseofpart-timeemployment
in part as a last resort. There was also evidence of muted discouragement effects in respect of
transitions in to self employment and inactivity. Another interesting result was the similarityin the
effect of unemployment benefits as between open-ended employment and fixed-term contracts.
Consequently, access to unemployment benefits does not seem to help workers obtain stable jobs.
However, there are two very different mechanisms at work here. On the one hand, high-turnover
workers flowintoandout offixed-termcontracts asemployers takeadvantageoftheunemployment
insurancesystem.Ontheotherhand,fixed-termcontractsalsoseemtobeusedasascreeningdevice
that eventually leads to permanent jobs.
Oneresultthatmaysurprisereadersisthenearuniformdisincentiveeffectofunemployment
benefits across the main ways of exiting unemployment (open-ended employment, temporary
employment,self-employment,andinactivity).Apparentlythemoralhazardaspectofsubsidization
dominates the intended insurance function of the unemployment benefit system irrespective of the
exit options available.
An obvious policyimplication of our analysis is that individuals should be allowed to draw
benefitsforsomeperiodaftertheytransitionintopart-timeemployment.(Reassuringly,Portuguese
law has recently been revised to allow this very option.) The more general policy implication is of
course that the maximum duration of benefits should be reduced and the age criterion removed23
where it might usefully be replaced by one based on previous job attachment. A final implication
would be that the Portuguese unemployment insurance system would benefit from introduction of
experience rating on the U.S. pattern so as to discourage the use by employers of excessive buffer
stocks of fixed-term contract workers.24
Endnotes
1. Forthose insured recipients who haveexhaustedtheirregularbenefits, themaximum durationof
unemploymentassistanceisone-halfthat dueunderUIproper.Thus,fora24-yearold,themaximum
duration of unemployment assistance would be another five months of income support. For
unemployment assistance recipients proper, the maximum duration of these (reduced) benefits is
exactlythesameasappliesforUIbenefits,andisagedetermined.Notethatthereplacementratefor
unemployment insurance ranges between 100 and 300 percent of the minimum wage, whereas for
unemployment assistance it is only 70-100 percent of the minimum wage.
2. Results from relaxing the assumption that insured individuals do not subsequently draw
unemployment assistance for the relevant age-related period will be noted in passing below. Full
results are available from the authors on request.
3.When wereran theregression assumingthat allthosewho received UIbenefitsproperwentonto
collectthemaximum(age-determined)durationofunemploymentassistance,thebenefitscoefficient
estimate was somewhat reduced in absolute magnitude.
4. Although the number of fixed-term transitions is high, it is the case that their frequency is
markedly lower than in neighboring Spain. This difference reflects the relatively stricter rules
governing fixed-term contracts in Portugal (see Bover et al., 2000).
5. To save on computational cost, age is redefined to be a continuous variable rather than a
categorical variable as formerly.
6. A log-likelihood ratio test confirmed that there were statistically significant differences in the
destination-specific regression coefficients at the .001 level: χ
2(100)= 684.9. Equally, a test based
onthenullthat thebaseline hazardfunctions differonlybyamultiplicative constantconfirmedthat
they were indeed distinct, the null being rejected at the .05 level: χ
2(50) = 68.8.25
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eTable 1: Estimated Piecewise-Constant Hazards Regression, Aggregate Model (n=9,451)







































     NORTH -0.236
(0.080)
     CENTER 0.059
(0.098)
     LISBOA -0.229
(0.078)
     ALGARVE -0.256
(0.107)
Log-likelihood -4361.755
Asymptotic standard errors in parenthesisTable 2: Summary Results of the Effect of Unemployment Benefits on Transitions Out of Unemployment (n=9,451)
Specification







































19 months or more -0.333
(0.239)











24 months or more -0.752
(0.228)
Log-likelihood -4361.8 -4363.1 -4365.2 -4352.9 -4358.7 -4356.6
Note: The full array of covariates are given in Table 2Table 3: Mean Values of Elapsed Duration and Unemployment Benefit Status by Destination State
Destination state
a
Variable  Open-ended employment Fixed-term contract Part time Public employment Self employment Inactivity Unemployed
DURATION 8.991 9.297 13.865 10.606 11.685 13.905 14.670
UB 0.223 0.206 0.077 0.451 0.260 0.210 0.362
TIMEEX 10.569 9.353 12.200 12.125 9.212 9.781 10.573
Number of events 457 743 104 71 119 305 7652
Note: 
aIndividuals that exit unemployment in to any of the six categories in the subsequent quarterTable 4: Estimated Piecewise-Constant Hazards Regression with Gamma Heterogeneity  by Destination State (n=9,451)
 
Transition to:
Variable  Open-ended employment Fixed-term contract Part time Self employment Public employment Inactivity
UB -0.660 -0.626 -1.989 -1.063 0.547 -0.612
(0.140) (0.123) (0.505) (0.349) (0.369) (0.226)
AGE -0.026 -0.033 -0.003 0.016 -0.020 0.008
(0.008) (0.007) (0.017) (0.019) (0.020) (0.010)
SCHOOLING -0.027 0.038 0.044 0.118 -0.002 0.007
(0.018) (0.016) (0.039) (0.046) (0.064) (0.029)
TENURE -0.018 -0.040 -0.012 -0.001 -0.049 0.014
(0.010) (0.011) (0.021) (0.019) (0.033) (0.012)
JOBS 0.005 0.043 -0.013 0.053 0.018 -0.010
(0.018) (0.012) (0.065) (0.037) (0.035) (0.037)
WHITE COLLAR -0.242 -0.381 -0.190 0.239 -0.389 0.177
(0.177) (0.149) (0.344) (0.395) (0.464) (0.241)
MARRIED 0.349 0.398 0.356 0.484 0.384 -0.428
(0.156) (0.137) (0.326) (0.396) (0.403) (0.275)
DISABILITY -1.047 -0.862 0.322 -0.793 0.804 -1.449
(0.540) (0.465) (0.736) (1.299) (0.711) (0.761)
FIRSTJOB -0.807 -0.400 -0.291 -1.306 -0.826 0.811
(0.212) (0.165) (0.436) (0.683) (0.640) (0.268)
LAYOFF 0.140 0.052 0.058 -0.111 -0.230 -0.719
(0.171) (0.169) (0.441) (0.468) (0.509) (0.303)
END FIXED -0.099 0.398 0.366 -0.104 -0.011 -0.310
(0.128) (0.113) (0.286) (0.334) (0.353) (0.217)
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE -0.150 -0.004 0.004 -0.028 -0.047 -0.200
(0.056) (0.050) (0.124) (0.158) (0.163) (0.088)
NORTH -0.058 -0.175 0.459 -0.206 -1.280 -0.824
(0.175) (0.156) (0.480) (0.546) (0.478) (0.275)
CENTER 0.129 0.120 1.392 -0.335 -1.240 0.015
(0.219) (0.195) (0.605) (0.744) (0.773) (0.323)
LISBOA -0.264 -0.068 0.603 0.175 -1.235 -0.567
(0.183) (0.151) (0.500) (0.498) (0.538) (0.260)
ALGARVE -0.294 -0.339 0.278 0.905 -0.013 -0.861
(0.244) (0.211) (0.642) (0.617) (0.507) (0.381)
sigma 0.495 0.347 0.474 1.473 0.145 0.794
(0.115) (0.298) (1.528) (0.515) (2.889) (0.212)
Log-likelihood  
Asymptotic standard errors in parenthesis
-6689.14Table 5: Summary Results of the Effect of Unemployment Benefits on Transitions Out of Unemployment by Destination State (n=9,451)
Transition to:
Variable  Open-ended employment Fixed-term contract Part time Public employment Self employment Inactivity
Panel (a)
UB -0.660 -0.626 -1.989 0.547 -1.063 -0.612
(0.140) (0.123) (0.505) (0.369) (0.349) (0.226)
sigma 0.495 0.347 0.474 0.794 0.145 1.473
(0.115) (0.298) (1.528) (0.212) (2.889) (0.515)
Log-likelihood
TIMEEX -0.044 -0.045 -0.084 0.043 -0.086 -0.045
(0.010) (0.009) (0.028) (0.021) (0.027) (0.014)
sigma 0.002 0.243 0.952 0.005 1.184 0.523
(0.306) (0.207) (0.540) (0.865) (1.008) (0.340)
Log-likelihood
Panel (b)
Recipient Time to Exhaustion
1-2 months 0.213 -0.266 -0.812
(0.403) (0.417) (0.838)
3-5 months -0.726 -0.382 -0.499
(0.395) (0.284) (0.539)
1-5 months -1.546 -1.013 1.839
(1.132) (1.034) (1.411)
6-11 months -0.812 -0.715 -2.893 0.784 -0.576 -0.876
(0.197) (0.168) (1.049) (0.354) (0.524) (0.327)
12-17 months -0.875 -0.538 -1.174 0.110 -2.434 -0.331
(0.267) (0.206) (0.672) (0.571) (0.814) (0.306)
18-23 months -0.723 -0.714 -1.902 1.169 -1.489 -0.827
(0.293) (0.279) (1.065) (0.518) (0.673) (0.422)
24 months or more -0.265 -0.948 -0.472 0.518 -2.442 -1.594
(0.338) (0.437) (0.834) (0.850) (0.960) (0.751)
sigma 0.077 0.330 1.261 0.199 1.748 0.638
(0.549) (0.172) (0.565) (1.089) (0.427) (0.317)
Log-likelihood
Asymptotic standard errors in parenthesis
Note: The full array of covariates are given in Table 2
-6689.14
-6696.2
-6669.3Appendix Table: Definition of Variables and Descriptive Statistics by Unemployment Benefit Recipiency
Recipient Nonrecipient 
Variable mean s.d. mean s.d.
UNOUT 0.125 0.223
transition out of unemployment =1, 0 otherwise
DURATION 11.828 11.240 14.888 18.764
elapsed unemployment in months 
AGE 41.816 12.704 30.826 12.381
age in years
SCHOOLING 5.771 3.430 7.117 3.782
years of schooling completed
TENURE 9.785 10.408 3.900 7.710
years of tenure on previous job
JOBS 3.483 3.925 2.508 3.444
number of previous jobs
WHITE COLLAR 0.232 0.168
=1 if white-collar employee, 0 otherwise
MARRIED 0.741 0.341
=1 if married, 0 otherwise
DISABILITY 0.015 0.021
=1 if disabled, 0 otherwise
FIRSTJOB 0.231
=1 if looking for first job, 0 otherwise
LAYOFF 0.305 0.090
=1 if job lost by reason of mass layoff, 0 otherwise
END FIXED 0.258 0.258
=1 if job lost through termination of a fixed-term contract, 0 otherwise
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE 6.640 0.839 6.540 0.940
quarterly unemployment rate
NORTH 0.400 0.351
=1 for the North region, 0 otherwise
CENTER 0.076 0.087
=1 for the Center region, 0 otherwise
LISBOA 0.347 0.358
=1 for the Lisboa and Vale do Tejo region, 0 otherwise
ALGARVE 0.070 0.090
=1 for the Algarve region, 0 otherwise
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